The aim of this study is to analyze the effects of IFRS adoption, analyst's coverage 
INTRODUCTION
The IFRS adoption by many countries has increased the mandatory disclosure of information that was not required by most country-specific accounting standards (GAAP).
Consequently, some kind of information considered as voluntary disclosure before the adoption of IFRS, could be changed to mandatory, changing the proprietary costs scheme.
However, there are different evidence around the world (Crawford, Lont and Scott 2014) .
In developed capital markets like the USA, disclosure may have an incremental effect (Verrecchia 2001 ), but studies that analyze different types of disclosure, such as mandatory, voluntary and environmental, show inconclusive results (Boesso and Kumar 2007) . In less developed markets, there may be a market demand for additional information beyond what is disclosed by the financial reporting. In addition, companies with shares traded in less developed capital markets may have different incentives to disclose information that is not required by their accounting standards (GAAP); they may use voluntary disclosure as a means of signaling or to differentiate themselves in the market. This IFRS environment can provide incentives for companies to be more transparent with their stakeholders, reducing information asymmetry. Disclosure therefore is considered an important way to improve the efficient allocation of resources from external agents (Botosan 1997; Verrecchia 2001) . The availability of information enables better financial and operating decisions.
Unlike many developed countries that have adopted IFRS, Brazil has an important environment for analysis, as it is an emerging country with a code law legal system, a fragile institutional environment, high ownership concentration and a low level of enforcement (Lopes and Walker 2010; Lopes and Alencar 2010; Almeida and Dalmacio 2015) . These factors can affect the quality of financial reporting process and voluntary disclosure.
Brazil has adopted IFRSs in two stages, differently from most countries: between 2008 and 2009, the anticipated adoption was voluntary (transition period) and not all IFRS were approved by Brazilian regulators, and the full IFRS became mandatory after 2010 (post-IFRS period). In addition, the IFRS requirements are applied throughout the financial reporting process (recognition, measurement and disclosure) on the legal (parent) company, not only in the consolidated financial statements. Thus, Brazilian public companies are used as the subject of analysis for defining our voluntary disclosure index before (pre-IFRS period), during the transition period and after the IFRS full adoption (post-IFRS period).
Therefore, expectations can be generated based on the fact that the IFRS adoption in Brazil introduces changes in the financial reporting process since 2008, then it will produce an institutional environment able to increase the voluntary disclosure level, due to greater enforcement of disclosure practices and changing the proprietary costs scheme. This new institutional environment could be a facilitator, in which voluntary information can be segregated from information that, under the IFRS standard, would become mandatory and more easily identifiable in the annual reports.
In this context, these effects of IFRS adoption, greater monitoring by financial analysts and ADR on voluntary disclosure were not well explored during the IFRS adoption process in emerging markets, thus we use Brazil as a setting which includes institutional and informational problems. Moreover, the understanding of how pressures from different market agents and regulation is scarce in this kind of environment. Thus, our research question is:
Has the quality of voluntarily disclosed information improved after IFRS adoption for firms with greater monitoring by analysts and American Depositary Receipts listings?
Following the methodology of Ho and Taylor (2013) , Al-Shattarat, Haddad and AlHares (2010), Eng and Malk (2003) and Botosan (1997) , we develop a voluntary disclosure index (discl) that is scored globally (see table 1 and section 3.1 for more details) and has two categories: (i) economic, financial and organizational items (disclefo); and (ii) social and environmental information (disclenv). The purpose of the separation into two categories is to understand the usefulness of the information contained in this work for different profiles of stakeholders. Moreover, Allegrini and Grecco (2013 p. 197) argue that "the assessment of the disclosure quality is still an open debate and there are not well established measurement methods". Aerts, Cormier and Magnan (2007) argue that disclosure could improve stock liquidity and increase the interest of analysts in monitoring certain companies. When market liquidity is translated into a lower cost of capital (Healy and Palepu 2001) , companies also have incentives to increase their voluntary disclosure levels, with the aim of attracting more analysts and reducing the dispersion of forecasts. Beyer et al (2010) add that, so far, there is little knowledge about the interaction between these sources of information (voluntary and mandatory disclosure) and the activity level of financial analysts.
Furthermore, for companies that issue American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on the NYSE Stock Exchange, there are high operating costs for producing information to serve the American market. Managers in these companies would have no great difficulty (or would have more incentive) to make greater amount information available (including voluntarily) in their respective countries of origin. In this case, cross-listing decisions suggests us a shift in disclosure quality once there are different proprietary costs among those firms.
The contribution of an exogenous determinant (regulation) is analyzed as well as the contribution to the improvement of voluntary corporate information quality under increased monitoring by analysts. Companies issuing ADR (levels II and III) are also analyzed because the disclosure decisions are endogenously determined by earnings quality (Dechow, Ge and Schrand 2010) . Our results show different incentives throughout IFRS adoption process, however positively consistent for analysts' coverage (monitoring effect) and ADR listings on NYSE.
Evidence is consistent for each disclosure index (full; economic, financial and organizational; and social and environmental). In addition, our evidence extend the literature complementing evidence from previous studies such as Lang et al. (2003) and Murcia and Santos (2012), also showing that the proprietary costs scheme changes according to external monitoring and pressure by financial analysts and ADR listing, respectively.
The results are still robust and significant when controlling for firm size, return on equity, leverage, ownership structure and Big Four auditing firms. These other variables could affect voluntary disclosure during the whole period of IFRS adoption in Brazil. The understanding of IFRS adoption in a code law jurisdiction could be useful to regulators and standard-setters, once IFRS is principle-oriented standard. This paper is divided into five sections. In the next section, the theoretical background is addressed and the hypotheses development. In the third section, the research design is presented, and this section addresses the research instruments, the development and validation of the voluntary disclosure score index and its applicability, the collection and treatment procedures of samples and data (variables), and the econometric models applied. The fourth section presents our results, and the fifth and final section contains our conclusions.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
The introduction of IFRS (and IAS) in a new jurisdiction changes the financial reporting process affecting earnings quality (Barth, Landsman and Lang 2008) and voluntary disclosure (La Bruslerie and Gabteni 2012; Crawford et al 2014) .
La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) present evidence that in French firms disclosure has increased significantly during the periods of pre-adoption and post-adoption of IFRS.
However, they argue that this increase in voluntary disclosure can be explained both by the overall pressure of the institutional environment and the beginning of enforcement brought on by the introduction of international accounting standards, where these two effects it is not easily separated.
Similarly, the adoption of IFRS in Brazil (mandatory disclosure) could provide insights into changes in the quality of voluntary disclosure, which is fostered by a positive institutional environment. Organizations could adopt higher levels of voluntary disclosure in the event of convergence of Brazilian GAAP (BR-GAAP) to IFRS.
Empirical evidence suggests that companies with greater monitoring by financial analysts have better disclosure (Healy, Huntton and Palepu 1999; Lang and Lundholm 2000) , and when disclosure policies are more informative, companies attract greater number of analysts monitoring their actions. A circle of cause and effect is thus established, in which the financial analysts are an important link (informational intermediaries) in the capital market, providing forecasts of earnings per share, stock prices, purchase and sale recommendations and other relevant information (Chang, Hooi and Wee 2014) . Santos, Ponte and Mapurunga (2014) show in Brazil low level of compliance with IFRS disclosure requirements in post-IFRS period (first year after IFRS adoption). Thus, whether notes requirements is stronger than pre-IFRS period firms could voluntarily disclose additional information to the market. Dye (2001, 224) suggests that a disclosure policy that produces a balance between the reduction of the cost of capital (increasing the value of the company) and strategic losses due to disclosure (trade-off) will involve the disclosure of a portion (but not all) of the private information. According to Grossmam and Hart (1980) the presence of transaction costs means that regulation can support the affected parties, helping them "to try to affect the efficiency of the production and distribution of information" (Grossman and Hart 1980, 326) . Daske, Hail, Leuz and Verdi (2008) find that, in more developed markets with higher levels of enforcement, companies have more incentives to be transparent, resulting in major benefits of capital. According to the authors, this is not true in markets where enforcement is weak, for example, in countries with less developed markets. Probably, the 'persuasion game' related to disclosure proposed by Milgrom (1981) works in different countries. However, Verrecchia (1983) shows that the costs related to the disclosure can help to explain the information quality, once outsiders are unable to interpret retained information as undeniable "bad news", and thus they reduce the value of the company to the point that insiders reflect on their actions (or lack of action).
Endogenous events that tend to affect the informational environments of organizations, such as an increase in voluntary information in financial reporting, often occur when a company adopts the IFRS standard (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) .
The survey conducted by Ashbaugh and Pincus (2001) suggests that IFRS provides better quality information, showing that companies applying IFRS have lower forecast errors by analysts. The authors conclude that the greater the difference between local accounting standards and IFRS, the higher the analysts' forecast errors, and they find that those errors are reduced after companies adopt the IFRS.
According to La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) , firms also react and voluntarily deliver more information to the market if the absolute forecast error of analysts is too high. Therefore, a greater disclosure resulting from the IFRS adoption could allow analysts to more accurately forecast firms' earnings per share (Ashbaugh and Pincus 2001) . Also, Almeida and Dalmacio (2015) show that the accuracy of analysts' forecasts varies according to the corporate governance level and product market competition in Brazil. Lang and Lundholm (1996) investigated the relationship between disclosure practices of companies, the number of analysts and their predictions. They used a disclosure model obtained from the Report of the Corporate Information Committee of the Federation of Financial Analysts and concluded that the disclosure level will determine the number of analysts who monitor the company's actions. However, Aerts et al. (2007) apply the same procedures as Lang and Lundholm (1996) , they found a weaker relationship between these variables in Europe.
In this context of IFRS adoption in Brazil and the role of informational intermediaries (analysts), our first hypothesis is:
H1: The IFRS adoption in Brazil has positive impact on the voluntary disclosure of companies with higher monitoring by financial analysts.
Few studies have explicitly examined the behavior of companies that issue ADR in relation to voluntary disclosure (Aggarwal, Cao, and Chen 2012) . According to the Bonding Hypothesis (Coffee, 1999) , companies based in emerging markets, which have difficulties in raising capital financing (mainly due to low liquidity), may submit to more rigorous scrutiny when deciding to list their stocks in more developed markets. Thus, companies that decide to issue ADR, particularly at levels II and III in the US market, due to the high degree of enforcement present in this market, are subject to the stricter rules of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Issuances of ADRs are also processes that generate high costs for cross-listing companies in order to meet SEC accounting requirements. Hope, Kang, and Kim (2013) argue that voluntary disclosure is seen as credible and economically important for these companies.
They find that the quality of voluntary disclosure from companies issuing ADRs is significantly lower compared to a sample of American companies. This suggests that there is room for improvement in the level of voluntary disclosure of Brazilian companies that issue ADR with the adoption of the IFRS.
We present the second hypothesis of this study:
H2: The IFRS adoption in Brazil has positive impact on the voluntary disclosure of companies that issue ADR.

RESEARCH DESIGN
Development of the Voluntary Disclosure Index
The voluntary disclosure index is developed from an analysis of 14 previous studies and is shown in Table 1 . The following items of Voluntary Disclosure were extracted from the studies of Botosan (1997) , Hail (2002) , Hossain and Reaz (2003) , Eng and Mak (2003) , Donnelly and Mulcahy (2008) , Murcia and Santos (2012) , Al-Shattarat, Haddad and Al-Hares (2010), La Bruslerie and Gabteni (2012) , Nurunnabi and Hossain (2012) , Ho and Taylor (2013) , Allegrini and Greco (2013) , Yuen et al. (2009) and Gisbert and Navallas (2013) , then we consider the most common items used by these authors. Then, to test the reliability of the voluntary disclosure index and the two categories, Cronbach's Alpha was used, which provided coefficients of 0.82 for the full disclosure index (DISCL), 0.94 for the economic, financial and organizational disclosure (DISCLEFO) and 0.97 for the social and environmental disclosure (DISCLENV), validating the internal reliability structure of the indexes.
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] Finally, the classified items of the voluntary disclosure total index (DISCL) are divided into two categories. The first category contains information related to economic, financial and organizational disclosure (DISCLEFO), consisting of 25 items, and the second category contains information related to social and environmental disclosure (DISCLENV), composed of 13 items. This classification is applied to the management reports and notes as information source for the content analysis. The disclosure index assumes 1 for the presence of the item and 0 (zero), otherwise, and each item receives the same weight. Table 2 shows the sample selection starting from a sample with 2,257 observations (firm-year), covering the period from 2006 to 2013. We consider to the sample only Brazilian public companies listed on the BOVESPA covered by at least one analyst.
Sample Selection
Financial industry is excluded (1,554 observations), because it is subject to a specific accounting regulation in accordance with the rules of the Central Bank of Brazil. We also excluded a total of 29 observations due to inconsistencies in numbers, omissions or errors in the calculations of the explanatory variables (23 observations) or the presence of empty cells (6 observations).
Finally, the data were winsorized at 2% to preserve the sample size and reduce the impact of outliers.
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Our final sample has 674 observations (firm-year). Despite the fact that our sample is exclusively composed by firms covered by at least one analyst, one can argue a possible bias in the sample. However, our focus is on the greater monitoring by analysts using a dummy variable assuming 1 for firms covered above the average of the number of analysts and 0, otherwise.
Empirical Models and Descriptive Statistics
We apply two econometric models to test our hypotheses. The first model analyses the effect of analysts' coverage and IFRS in different periods and then the marginal effect of the interaction between analysts and IFRS. We use control variables in order to isolate the effect of the variables of interest (IFRS, analysts coverage and ADR) and to control for the Brazilian institutional structure. The control variables are represented by the size, return on equity, leverage, growth opportunities, Big Four auditing firms and ownership structure according to previous studies (Raffournier 1995; Depoers 2000; Murcia and Santos 2012; Lopes and Alencar 2010; Almeida and Dalmacio 2015) .
The first model is: The second model is show as follow:
Where: !,!" * !" is the marginal effect of the interaction between firm i that issued ADRs (levels II or III) and IFRS adoption periods; the other variables were defined according to model (1). Finally, we use several estimators' procedures to ensure the robustness of our results. Other important point is cross-sectional correlation because IFRS adoption is a "exogenous shock" that affect all firms, then we cluster standard errors at the firm level and by year (Petersen, 2009 ). Table 5 Similarly, the variable ADR has a more significant relationship with the voluntary disclosure when the IFRS adoption period is analyzed thoroughly. However, after IFRS adoption (post-IFRS) the relation is not significant, only when post-IFRS interacts with ADR.
RESULTS
In sum, the relationship of companies with higher monitoring and those that issue ADRs contributes to enhance voluntary disclosure. A possible explanation is to firms differentiate themselves from each other due to the attendance of the US capital market demand for voluntary information, probably due to lower proprietary costs of cross-listing firms. The results is robust when the use of control variables according to previous studies (Raffournier 1995; Depoers 2000; Almeida and Dalmacio 2015) .
Additionally, the same regressions were performed by the jack-knife method, NeweyWest estimator and also with the presence of outliers, whereas the slopes coefficients, as well as significance level, remain qualitatively the same, corroborating the validation of the adopted econometric models. We also use the natural logarithm of numbers of analysts for robustness check and the results are qualitatively similar.
CONCLUSIONS
This study shows the effects of IFRS adoption in Brazil on voluntary disclosure. We investigate the monitoring effect by financial analysts and ADR (cross-listing) effect during the whole IFRS adoption process.
Our results show that all disclosure indexes increased during the IFRS adoption periods.
Also, the consistent positive association between the interaction of post-IFRS and ADR can be explained by the arguments of Ball, Kothari and Robin (2000) , that the demand for disclosure in common law countries could be higher than in Code Law countries. !,!" is the j voluntary disclosure index (discl = full disclosure index; disclefo = disclosure of economic, financial and organizational items; or disclenv = social and environmental information) of firm i in year t; !,!" is the j period of IFRS adoption process in Brazil: pre-IFRS (between 2006 , transition (voluntary adoption between 2008 (voluntary adoption between -2009 (voluntary adoption between ) and post-IFRS adoption (between 2010 (voluntary adoption between -2013 ;
!" is equal to 1 if company i, at the end of year t, has a greater number of analysts who monitor its actions than the average in year i, and it is equal to 0 for other company-year combinations; nan is the number of analysts in the sample;
!" is equal to 1 if company i issued ADRs (levels II or III) during year t or 0, otherwise; !" is the control variable that represents the return on equity of firm I in year t; !,! is the control variable that represents the size of firm i in period t measured by the natural logarithm of total assets; !,! is the control variable that measures the leverage of firm i in year t; ℎ !,! is the control variable that measures the growth opportunities of company i in year t measured by change in operating income deflated by operating income in t-1; 4 !,! is the variable assigned to firm i in year t, where 1 is chosen for those audited by one of the "big four" and 0 otherwise; !,! is the variable assigned to firm i in year t, where 1 is chosen for those companies that have a single shareholder with more than 50% of the shares, and 0 otherwise. A, B and C are mean tests, the null hypothesis of Wilcoxon is: a: discl, disclefo and disclenv: pre-IFRS = post-IFRS, b: discl, disclefo and disclenv: pre-IFRS = transit-IFRS and c: discl, disclefo and disclenv: transit-IFRS = post-IFRS -IFRS adoption (2010 -IFRS adoption ( -2013 ; DAN is equal to 1 if the firm i at the end of the year t, has a number of analysts that monitor its actions higher than the sample average in the year i and 0, otherwise; 〖adr〗_it is equal to 1 if company i issued ADRs (levels II or III) during year t or 0, otherwise; SIZE is the control variable that represents the size of the company i, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year t; ROE is the control variable return on equity of firm i in year t; LEV is the control variable that measures the leverage of the company i in the year t; GROWTH is the control variable that measures the growth opportunities of the company i in the year t; BIG4 is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those audited by one of the "big four" auditing firm and 0 for the others; and OWNER is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those who have a single shareholder with more than 50% of the shares and 0 for the others. *, **, *** statistically significant at p <0.1, p <0.05, p <0.01, respectively. (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) ; DAN is equal to 1 if the firm i at the end of the year t, has a number of analysts that monitor its actions higher than the sample average in the year i and 0, otherwise;
!" is equal to 1 if company i issued ADRs (levels II or III) during year t or 0, otherwise; SIZE is the control variable that represents the size of the company i, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year t; ROE is the control variable return on equity of firm i in year t; LEV is the control variable that measures the leverage of the company i in the year t; GROWTH is the control variable that measures the growth opportunities of the company i in the year t; BIG4 is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those audited by one of the "big four" auditing firm and 0 for the others; and OWNER is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those who have a single shareholder with more than 50% of the shares and 0 for the others. *, **, *** statistically significant at p <0.1, p <0.05, p <0.01, respectively. [2010] [2011] [2012] [2013] ; DAN is equal to 1 if the firm i at the end of the year t, has a number of analysts that monitor its actions higher than the sample average in the year i and 0, otherwise;
!" is equal to 1 if company i issued ADRs (levels II or III) during year t or 0, otherwise; SIZE is the control variable that represents the size of the company i, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year t; ROE is the control variable return on equity of firm i in year t; LEV is the control variable that measures the leverage of the company i in the year t; GROWTH is the control variable that measures the growth opportunities of the company i in the year t; BIG4 is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those audited by one of the "big four" auditing firm and 0 for the others; and OWNER is the control variable assigned to the company i in the year t, where 1 is chosen for those who have a single shareholder with more than 50% of the shares and 0 for the others. *, **, *** statistically significant at p <0.1, p <0.05, p <0.01, respectively. 
